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Abstract. In this short note, we describe an approval-based committee
selection rule that admits a polynomial-time algorithm and satisfies the
Extended Justified Representation (EJR) axiom. This rule is based on
approximately maximizing the PAV score, by means of local search. Our
proof strategy is to show that this rule provides almost optimal aver-
age satisfaction to all cohesive groups of voters, and that high average
satisfaction for cohesive groups implies extended justified representation.
1 Introduction
Committee selection rules, i.e., rules that, given a collection of voters’ preferences
over candidates, output a fixed-size set of winners (a committee), have received
a considerable amount of attention in the last few years [3]. For approval-based
committee selection rules, i.e., rules where each voter reports a subset of can-
didates that she approves of, an influential recent paper of Aziz et al. [1] has
proposed an axiom called extended justified representation (EJR). Informally,
this axiom requires that if there is a large group of voters whose preferences
have substantial overlap, then this group should be well-represented in the com-
mittee. Aziz et al. [1] have established that, among existing committee selection
rules, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) is the only rule that satisfies this
axiom. Unfortunately, computing the output of this rule is NP-hard [2], and,
moreover, Aziz et al. [1] have established that verifying if a given committee
provides EJR is computationally hard as well. Therefore, it was conjectured
that finding committees that provide EJR is NP-hard.
In this paper, we show that this conjecture is false: we describe a polynomial-
time procedure that is guaranteed to output a committee that provides EJR. Our
proof makes use of a recently introduced notion of average satisfaction [4,6]: we
show that our rule offers very high average satisfaction to all groups of voters
that are large and cohesive, and deduce from this that it satisfies EJR. Thus,
in a sense, the welfare guarantees provided by our rule are even much stronger
than those offered by EJR.
2 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (N,C), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of voters and
C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates. Voters in N have approval preferences:
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each voter in N approves a subset of candidates in C. For each i ∈ N we denote
by Ai ⊆ C the set of candidates approved by voter i. We are interested in
procedures that, given an election E and a positive integer k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|,
output a non-empty collection of subsets of candidates W ⊆ C of size exactly k;
such procedures are called committee selection rules.
Given an election E = (N,C), we define the PAV-score of a committee
W ⊆ C as
pav-sc(W ) =
n∑
i=1
|Ai∩W |∑
j=1
1
j
.
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) is the committee selection rule that,
given an election E and a committee size k, outputs a committee of size W
with the highest PAV-score; finding a committee in the output of this rule is
NP-hard [2,5].
We say that a group of voters V ⊆ N is ℓ-cohesive if |V | ≥
⌈
ℓ · nk
⌉
and
|
⋂
i∈V Ai| ≥ ℓ.
Definition 1 (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [4]). Given a committee W , the
average satisfaction of a group of voters V ⊆ N with respect to W is defined as
avsW (V ) =
1
|V |
∑
i∈V
|Ai ∩W |.
Definition 2 (Aziz et al. [1]). A committee W provides extended justified
representation (EJR) if for every ℓ > 0 and every ℓ-cohesive group of voters V
there exists a voter i ∈ V who approves at least ℓ members of W , i.e., |Ai∩W | ≥
ℓ. A committee selection rule satisfies extended justified representation if for
every election E = (N,C) and every k with 1 ≤ k ≤ |C| all committees that it
outputs provide EJR.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. [4] show that if a committee W provides EJR then
for every ℓ > 0 and every ℓ-cohesive group of voters V it holds that the average
satisfaction of V with respect to W is at least ℓ−1
2
. We observe that, conversely,
if a committee provides very high average satisfaction to all cohesive groups then
it provides EJR.
Lemma 3. Consider an election E = (N,C) and a committee W . If for every
ℓ-cohesive group it holds that its average satisfaction with respect to W is strictly
greater than ℓ− 1, then W provides EJR.
Proof. Let V be an ℓ-cohesive group. Since the average satisfaction of voters in
V is greater than ℓ− 1, there is at least one voter i ∈ V with |Ai ∩W | ≥ ℓ. ⊓⊔
3 Local search Algorithm for PAV
We define a new rule, LS-PAV, which is a local search algorithm for PAV (see
Figure 1).
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Algorithm 1: LS-PAV: a local search algorithm for PAV
W ← k arbitrary candidates from C
while there exist c ∈ W and c′ ∈ C \W such that
pav-sc
(
(W \ {c}) ∪ {c′}
)
≥ pav-sc(W ) + n
k2
do
W ← (W \ {c}) ∪ {c′}
return W
Theorem 4. Consider an election E = (N,C) and a positive integer k, 1 ≤
k ≤ |C|. Let W be a winning committee chosen by LS-PAV on (E, k). Then for
every ℓ > 0 and every ℓ-cohesive group V it holds that avsW (V ) > ℓ− 1, i.e., all
ℓ-cohesive groups have average satisfaction of more than ℓ− 1.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that for some (E, k) LS-PAV out-
puts a committeeW such that there exists an ℓ-cohesive group V with avsW (V ) ≤
ℓ− 1. Let wi = |W ∩ Ai|.
As V is ℓ-cohesive, there exist ℓ candidates approved by all voters in V . At
least one such candidate does not appear in W , since otherwise we would have
avsW (V ) ≥ ℓ. Let c be some such candidate. Now consider a candidate c
′ ∈ W .
If we remove c′ from the committee and add c instead, we increase the PAV-score
of W by
∆(c, c′) ≥
∑
i∈V :c′ /∈Ai
1
wi + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
adding c
−
∑
i∈N\V : c′∈Ai
1
wi︸ ︷︷ ︸
removing c′
=
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N : c′∈Ai
1
wi
+
∑
i∈V : c′∈Ai
(
1
wi
−
1
wi + 1
)
.
Note that ∆(c, c′) may be negative for some c′ ∈W . By the inequality between
arithmetic and harmonic means we obtain∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
≥
|V |2∑
i∈V (wi + 1)
=
|V |
∑
i∈V
wi
|V | + 1
=
|V |
avsW (V ) + 1
≥
|V |
ℓ
. (1)
Now, observe that
∑
c′∈W
∆(c, c′) ≥
∑
c′∈W
(∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N : c′∈Ai
1
wi
+
∑
i∈V : c′∈Ai
(
1
wi
−
1
wi + 1
))
= k
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
−
∑
c′∈W
∑
i∈N : c′∈Ai
1
wi
+
∑
c′∈W
∑
i∈V : c′∈Ai
(
1
wi
−
1
wi + 1
)
= k
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
−
∑
i∈N
∑
c′∈W∩Ai
1
wi
+
∑
i∈V
∑
c′∈W∩Ai
(
1
wi
−
1
wi + 1
)
= k
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
− n+ |V | −
∑
i∈V
wi
wi + 1
3
= k
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
− n+ |V | −
∑
i∈V
(
1−
1
wi + 1
)
= (k + 1)
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
− n.
Further, by equation (1) we obtain
k
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
− n ≥
k|V |
ℓ
− n ≥
⌈
ℓn
k
⌉
·
k
ℓ
− n ≥ 0,
and hence∑
c′∈W
∆(c, c′) ≥ (k + 1)
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
− n ≥
∑
i∈V
1
wi + 1
≥
|V |
ℓ
≥
n
k
.
From the pigeonhole principle it follows that there exists c′ ∈ W such that
∆(c, c′) ≥ nk2 , which means that W could not have been returned by our local
search algorithm. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5. For PAV all ℓ-cohesive groups have average satisfaction of more
than ℓ− 1.
Note that Theorem 4 applies not only to LS-PAV but also to PAV, as PAV
selects a committee with the maximum PAV-score.
Corollary 6. LS-PAV satisfies extended justified representation.
Proof. Let E = (N,C) be an election, let k be a positive integer with 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|
and let W be a winning committee chosen by LS-PAV. Further, let V be an ℓ-
cohesive group. Then, by Theorem 4 it holds that avsW (V ) > ℓ−1. Consequently,
by Lemma 3, W provides EJR. ⊓⊔
Proposition 7. LS-PAV is computable in polynomial time.
Proof. A single improving swap can be clearly found and executed in polynomial
time. Now, let us assess how many improvements the local search algorithm may
perform. Each improvement increases the total PAV-score of a committee by at
least nk2 . The maximum score a committee can get is n · (1 +
1/2 + · · · + 1/k) =
O(n ln(k)). Thus, there may be at most O(k2 ln(k)) improving swaps. ⊓⊔
Observe that Proposition 7 relies on having a threshold of nk2 in the def-
inition of the local search algorithm. If we perform a swap each time when
pav-sc
(
(W \ {c}) ∪ {c′}
)
≥ pav-sc(W ), this could potentially lead to a super-
polynomial running time, since by a naive argument we could only conclude that
each swap increases the total PAV score of a committee by one over the least
common multiple of values 1, 2, . . . , k, which can be exponential with respect to
k.
We will now show that the satisfaction guarantee given by Theorem 4 cannot
be improved.
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(a) Example for k = 3 (b) Example for k = 4
Fig. 1: A visualization of the profiles used in Example 8. Dots represent voters
and boxes represent candidates; candidates are approved by those voters that
the respective boxes contain.
Example 8. Consider the following election.
1× {d, a} 2× {a}
1× {a, b} 2× {b}
1× {b, c} 2× {c}
1× {c, d} 2× {d}
This profile is schematically shown in Figure 1a. For k = 3, we have nk = 4
and consequently all voters that approve a fixed candidate form a 1-cohesive
group. The profile is symmetric with respect to candidates so without loss of
generality assume that committee {a, b, c} is chosen. Let us consider the voters
who approve d, i.e., {d, a}, 2 × {d}, and {c, d}. The average satisfaction of this
group is 1/2. Hence we have found a profile where it is impossible to guarantee
an average satisfaction for 1-cohesive groups that is better than 1/2.
Let us now extend this example for k = 4, moving from a rectangle shape to
a pentagon (see Figure 1b).
1× {e, a} 3× {a}
1× {a, b} 3× {b}
1× {b, c} 3× {c}
1× {c, d} 3× {d}
1× {d, e} 3× {e}
By the same argument as before, we can assume without loss of generality
that e is not contained in the committee. The average satisfaction of the re-
spective group is 2
5
and we see that we cannot guarantee an average satisfaction
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of more that 2
5
for 1-cohesive groups. If we generalize these types of examples
to larger k, we can deduce that we cannot guarantee an average satisfaction of
more than 2k for 1-cohesive groups. Hence, for arbitrary k, there is no positive
constant γ such that we can guarantee an average satisfaction of γ for 1-cohesive
groups.
Proposition 9. Let ℓ be a positive integer and γ > 0. It is not possible to
guarantee an average satisfaction of ℓ− 1 + γ for ℓ-cohesive groups.
Proof. We have seen in Example 8 how to construct profiles where 1-cohesive
groups cannot have an average satisfaction better than 2k . If we choose k >
2
γ , then we have shown the statement for ℓ = 1. This construction can easily
be generalized for arbitrary ℓ. We replace each candidate with ℓ copies; voters
approve all copies of previously approved candidates. In this case there is at least
one ℓ-cohesive group with only ℓ− 1 of their joint candidates approved; let this
group be V . We have avsW (V ) = ℓ − 1 +
2
γ . As before, for k >
2
γ we obtain an
example showing that an average satisfaction of ℓ− 1 + γ for ℓ-cohesive groups
cannot be guaranteed. ⊓⊔
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